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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
This Amicus Curiae brief is submitted on behalf of (1) thirty-nine law
school faculty members from the University of Baltimore School of Law and from
the University of Maryland School of Law1 who are deeply committed to
"contributing to the legal profession" and "enhancing access to justice" as
declared in the mission statements of their respective law schools; and (2) the
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, a national, non
profit, membership organization of attorneys, law students, and paralegals
committed to the fair and humane administration of the United States immigration
laws and respect for the civil and constitutional rights of all persons.
The case raises an important issue of the voluntariness of a guilty plea
entered by a non-citizen immigrant in a criminal case where the defendant is given
assurances by immigration authorities that the guilty plea will not have
immigration consequences. In addition to Petitioner, there are hundreds if not
thousands of lawful immigrants who face removal from this country based upon
minor criminal convictions after being given assurances that such would not occur.
Given the life-changing, even life-shattering effect of immigration consequences,
Amici believe it is vital to the integrity of our constitutional guarantees that these
consequences be taken properly into effect.
1For a complete list of the Amici please consult Appendix A-l for the list of faculty from
the University of Baltimore School of Law and Appendix A-2 for the list of faculty from
the University of Maryland School of Law.
Amici here submit an overview of the interactions between criminal
convictions and immigration consequences, as well as the wealth of authority
supporting the withdrawal of a plea entered in reliance on affirmative
misinformation about important consequences such as immigration. Amici ask this
Court to grant coram nobis relief in this matter and recognize that no criminal plea
can be considered voluntary and knowing when entered in reliance on
affirmatively false information about immigration consequences.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the Court of Special appeals improperly rule that Petitioner's guilty
plea was voluntary where he was assured by his attorney, the prosecutor, and an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorney that he would not be deported if
he pleaded guilty when, in fact, no such assurances were possible and the plea led
to Petitioner's deportation proceeding?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Amici accept and adopt the Statement of the Facts that is set forth in
the Brief of Petitioner.
ARGUMENT
I. Petitioner's plea was not voluntary and knowing because it was based
on misinformation about the direct consequence of deportation.
A. Significant changes in federal law have made the immigration
consequences of a conviction direct consequences of the conviction.
This Court has never directly analyzed whether immigration consequences are
direct or collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. In Yoswick v. State, 347
Md. 228 (Md. 1997) and Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52 (Md. 2000), the Court assumed
without analysis that the consequences were collateral in nature. See, Yoswick v.
State, 347 Md. 228, 240 (Md. 1997); Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 77-78 (Md. 2000).
In Yoswick, this Court cited with apparent approval the Court of Special Appeals
case ofDaley v. State, 61 Md. App. 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), which applied
the standard of Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institute, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.
1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973), to find that immigration consequences
were collateral rather than direct consequences of a conviction, but did not directly
address the question. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 240.
However, the Daley court issued its decision over 20 years ago in 1985 and
based its analysis of the directness of consequences on the state of immigration
law at that time. Since that time, Congress has substantially re-written our nation's
immigration laws, particularly with regard to the consequences of criminal
activity. Criminal convictions have, since the early 20 century, carried
immigration consequences, but the substance of those consequences, as well as the
procedures by which they are applied, have been thoroughly transformed since
1985. For this reason, Amici ask the Court to address the question of the directness
of immigration consequences in the context of this case and of current
immigration law.
1. The Immigration Landscape at the Time of Daley v. State
In 1985 when the Maryland Court of Special Appeals looked at the question of the
directness of immigration consequences in Daley, immigration consequences of
convictions were significant, but they were also subject to vagaries of enforcement
and open to amelioration through widely available discretionary waivers of
deportability for those convicted of crimes.
Since 1917, non-citizens who have committed crimes "involving moral
turpitude" have been excludable from the United States. The Immigration Act of
1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 875 (1917), cited in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 294 (2001). From that same time, however, immigration law also provided
for a broad discretionary exception to that bar for long-term residents who could
show they were, on the whole, deserving of a second chance. The Immigration Act
of 1917, 39 Stat. 878. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), enacted in
1952, like the 1917 law, contained provisions excluding, among others, those
individuals convicted of crimes of moral turpitude or of drug trafficking. See, The
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 1952. Also like the
prior law, the INA in 1952 gave the Attorney General broad discretion to admit
individuals notwithstanding their convictions, provided they had been residing in
the United States for seven years. INA, 66 Stat. 187. See also, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)
(repealed 1996). This "section 212(c) waiver," named for its location in the INA,
was also applied to waive deportation for lawful permanent residents of at least
seven years, Matter of Silva, 16 I&N Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976), adopting the
position of Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), and it was widely
available and used by non-citizens seeking relief from deportation after a criminal
conviction. In the period between 1989 and 1995, (prior to 1997 when the
provision was eliminated) over 10,000 individuals were granted 212(c) relief. See,
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001) (citing Julie K. Rannik, The Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for the
212(c) Waiver, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 150, n. 80 (1996)). More than
half of all 212(c) applications filed during that time period were granted. Id.
In addition, in 1985 at the time of Daley, the immigration law provided for
judicial recommendations against deportation (JRADs), which, if granted by a
judge in a criminal proceeding, prohibited the federal government from using a
conviction as the basis for deportation or exclusion. INA, §241(b), 66 Stat. 208
(repealed 1990); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (repealed 1990).
Furthermore, in 1985 there was little coordination between the criminal and
the immigration bureaucracies, and the enforcement of deportation or exclusion
provisions against individuals with convictions was uneven at best. Many
deportable individuals were able to remain living in the U.S. for many years
without threat of removal as long as they did not bring themselves to the attention
of the government by leaving and seeking to reenter the country or by applying for
some immigration or naturalization benefit.
This was, quickly sketched, the state of the law of immigration and crimes
in 1985 when the Maryland Court of Special Appeals looked at the question of the
directness of immigration consequences in Daley.
2. Changes to the Immigration Landscape Between 1985 and
1996
In 1988, Congress began a process of revising the INA as it relates to individuals
with convictions. This process began slowly and gathered steam until it
culminated in 1996 in the profound revolution in the law of immigration and
convictions that was embodied in the passage of two laws: the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, title IV, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996); and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996), known as AEDPA and IIRIRA. These changes vastly expanded the
universe of crimes for which an individual could be excluded or deported and, to a
great extent and, in the case of many crimes, completely eliminated the discretion
granted to the Attorney General to waive deportation for those convicted of
crimes. As a result of these changes, the conclusion of deportation now often
follows virtually automatically from the fact of the conviction.
In the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-690, title
VII, subtitle J; 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5937), Congress started
on this road when it invented a category of offense called the "aggravated felony,"
which included murder and trafficking in drugs or weapons. Pub. L. No. 100-690,
title VII, subtitle J § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Those convicted of aggravated
felonies were made deportable, were subject to mandatory detention during
deportation proceedings, and were disqualified from a form of relief from
deportation called "voluntary departure," Id. at §§ 7344(a), 7343(a), and 7343(b).
At this time, Congress also greatly expanded the range of firearms offenses that
rendered one deportable. Id. at § 7342. It did not, however, make any changes to
the Section 212(c) discretionary relief from deportation, which still provided relief
to thousands of non-citizens convicted of crimes.
In 1990, Congress again acted to expand deportability and restrict
discretionary relief for those convicted of crimes. It expanded the definition of an
"aggravated felony" to include drug trafficking, money laundering and any crime
of violence for which a term of imprisonment of 5 years or more was imposed, and
it barred 212(c) discretionary relief for anyone convicted of an aggravated felony
who was sentenced to at least 5 years imprisonment. Immigration Act of 1990
(IMMACT90) §501, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat 4978, 5048 (1990);
IMMACT90 §511, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat, at 5052 (1990). It furthermore
completely eliminated judicial recommendations against deportation (JRADs).
IMMACT90 §505, Pub. L. No. 101-649,104 Stat, at 5050 (1990).
Significantly, IMMACT90 also began a long process of restricting and
streamlining procedures for adjudicating cases involving aggravated felonies. For
example, Section 504 provided for mandatory detention of all aggravated felons
except lawful permanent residents pending the outcome of deportation
proceedings. IMMACT90 §504, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat, at 5049-50 (1990).
It also required states, as a way of facilitating identification and immigration
prosecution of those convicted of crimes, to establish a plan to provide the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) with certified records of conviction
within 30 days of any conviction under state law. IMMACT90 §507, Pub. L. No.
101-649, 104 Stat, at 5050-51 (1990).
Congress continued to streamline the deportation process for individuals
convicted of aggravated felonies in the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). For the
first time, this Act gave the Attorney General the power to bypass deportation
proceedings entirely for any non-lawful permanent resident convicted of an
2The INS was the predecessor of the current Department of Homeland Security's United States Citizenship
and Immigration Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, and Customs and Border Patrol
agency.
aggravated felony and ineligible for relief from deportation. Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130004, 108 Stat. 2026
(1994). Individuals in this category were deprived of the right to an administrative
deportation hearing and permitted only limited judicial review of the agency
decision to determine whether they were, in fact, not a lawful permanent resident,
not eligible for relief and had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. In
addition, Congress began a long process of tightening connections between the
criminal and immigration systems to ensure that individuals who were deportable
for convictions were directly identified and deported. See, e.g., Criminal Alien
Tracking Center §130002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2023.
In the same year, through the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Congress provided that a federal criminal sentencing
judge has jurisdiction in certain circumstances to issue an order of deportation
based on the conviction at the same time as the sentencing, thereby bypassing
entirely the separate deportation hearing process. Immigration and Nationality
Technical Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, §224, 108 Stat. 4305,
4322-24 (1994). Congress also significantly expanded the definition of
"aggravated felony" again, so that the definition now included 16 different
offenses ranging from murder to failure to appear to serve a sentence of 15 years
or more (§222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-21(1994)), and expanded the grounds for
deportation and exclusion for many crimes to include attempts and conspiracies to
commit those crimes. §§203, 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4311, 4320-21.
To this point, Congress had significantly expanded criminal grounds for
deportation and exclusion, but in 1996, Congress passed AEDPA ("Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act") and IIRIRA ("Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act"), two laws that substantially overhauled the way
that immigration law had previously treated individuals with convictions. These
two laws together revolutionized the way that convictions were addressed by the
immigration system. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act, §§304, 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-587 (1996). They redefined and
substantially broadened (again) the universe of crimes for which one could be
removed from the U.S. by expanding the definition of what constitutes both a
"conviction" and a term of imprisonment (§322(a)(l) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) for immigration purposes (including,
for example, suspended sentences within the latter for the first time), and further
broadening the definition of aggravated felonies (§321(a) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act). For example, whereas
the prior aggravated felony definition had included only crimes of theft or violence
3IIRIRA evenchanged the very basic categories ofdeportation, eliminating
"deportation" and "exclusion" proceedings in favor of the single "removal" proceeding.
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for which a five year term of incarceration was imposed, aggravated felonies now
included (and continue to include), among many other things, any crime of theft or
violence for which a sentence, even a suspended sentence, of only one year was
imposed.4 (§321(a)(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act).
Even more significantly, though, in IIRIRA, Congress eliminated the
immigration judge's traditional power to exercise discretion on behalf of
individuals with many convictions by completely eliminating the traditional
212(c) waiver ((§304(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act) and replacing it with a much more limited form of relief for
which, among other restrictions, individuals with any conviction from the much-
expanded aggravated felony list were made categorically ineligible. Section 304(a)
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. See also,
current INA §240a(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a)(3). The 212(c) waiver, which had
provided discretionary relief from removal for many thousands of individuals per
year prior to 1996, was no longer. St. Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. at 296, 121 S.Ct. at
2277.
Furthermore, AEDPA and IIRIRA included a variety of provisions that
significantly tightened the coordination between criminal and immigration
4See, discussion, infra, of examples ofcurrent provisions under Maryland lawwhich
constitute aggravated felonies, many of which are surprisingly minor.
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proceedings, to ensure that criminal defendants passed as directly as possible from
the state or federal criminal system to removal proceedings. For example, the
Attorney General was directed to detain all individuals convicted of virtually any
crime upon their release from incarceration, parole, supervised release, or
probation, and was directed to hold them, with no possibility of release on bond,
pending removal proceedings and after an order of removal. ((§303(a) of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act). Thus, subsequent
to October 9, 1998, when this provision went into effect, any deportable individual
incarcerated even for a short time was subject to mandatory detention until the
government could complete removal proceedings and remove the individual. In
addition, provisions for expedited removal proceedings for convicted individuals
serving sentences were broadened. (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, §442, 110 Stat. 1279 (1996)). The jurisdiction of federal district court judges
to enter removal orders directly was also expanded from aggravated felony cases
to any deportable criminal offense, (§374 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act) and their authority to enter a removal order as a
condition of probation was written into statute. (§374 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) Finally, Congress ordered immigration
authorities to continue to develop systems to identify and track non-citizens with
convictions, including a "criminal alien identification system" which would be
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used to help local, state and federal law enforcement identify and locate non-
citizens subject to removal because of convictions. Criminal Alien Tracking
Center, §130002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2023, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132,
Title IV, §432, 110 Stat. 1273 (1996); and by Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, Title
III, §§ 308(g)(5)(b), 326, 327, 110 Stat. 3009-623, 3009-630 (1996).
3. Current immigration law regarding convictions
The reach of current INA provisions regarding crimes is extremely long. Non-
citizens are removable and/or inadmissible for offenses involving moral turpitude
(INA §§237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii); and INA
§212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)), virtually any drug offense
(INA §237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B); and INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8
U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)), firearms offenses (INA §237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(C)), domestic violence offenses (INA §237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C.
§1227(a)(2)(E)) and the now much-expanded category of "aggravated felonies."
INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
The definition of aggravated felonies has now expanded to include many
offenses which are neither "aggravated" nor felonies. The list now includes 20
separate categories of offenses, and encompasses a wide range of offenses, some
of which are quite serious, but many of which are relatively minor. INA
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§101(a)(43)(A) - (43)(U), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(A) - (43)(U).5 Furthermore,
though some of the definitions are triggered by sentences to incarceration of one
5INA §101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), defines "aggravated felony":
(43) The term "aggravated felony" means—
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in
section 924(c) of title 18, United States Code);
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921
of title 18, United States Code) or in explosive materials (as defined in section
841(c) of that title);
(D) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18, United States Code (relating
to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful
activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000;
(E) an offense described in—
(i) section 842 (h) or (i) of title 18, United States Code, or section 844(d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials
offenses);
(ii) section 922(g) (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), Q\ (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924 (b)
or (h) of title 18, United States Code (relating to firearms offenses); or
(iii) section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to
firearms offenses);
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code,
but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of
imprisonment at least one year;
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for
which the term of imprisonment at least one year;
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18, United
States Code (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom);
(I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251 A, or 2252 of title 18, United States
Code (relating to child pornography);
(J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18, United States Code (relating to
racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section
1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to
gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more
may be imposed;
(K) an offense that—
(i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a
prostitution business;
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(ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18, United States
Code (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if
committed; or
(iii) is described in any of sections 1581-1585 or sections 1588-1591 of
title 18, United States Code (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, and trafficking in persons);
(L) an offense described in—
(i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense
information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information),
2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title
18, United States Code;
(ii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421)
(relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents);
or
(iii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to
protecting the identity of undercover agents);
(M) an offense that—
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government
exceeds $10,000;
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) [8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)] (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for
which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense
for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child,
or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this Act;
(O) an offense described in section275(a) or 276 [8 U.S.C. § 1325 or § 1326]
committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a
conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting,
mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of
title 18, United States Code, or is described in section 1546(a) of such title
(relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment at
least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has
affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of
assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no
other individual) to violate a provision of this Act;
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of
sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of
5 years or more;
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year or more, the INA defines a sentence to incarceration to include any suspended
sentence, so sentences with no actual jail time also trigger the definition. INA
§101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). "Aggravated felony" offenses in
Maryland now include second degree "simple" assault under CL §3-203 (with a
sentence or suspended sentence of 365 days or more), possession of any illegal
drug with intent to distribute under CL §5-602 (regardless of sentence), third
degree burglary under CL §6-204 (with a sentence or suspended sentence of 365
days or more), the misdemeanor rendering a child in need of assistance at issue in
this case (now found at CJ §3-828), and even theft under $500 in violation of CL
§7-104 (with a sentence or suspended sentence of 365 days or more). Furthermore,
by definition, any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes is also
considered an "aggravated felony." INA §101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(43)(U). Finally, Congress defined aggravated felony to include any of
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or
trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction ofjustice, perjury or subornation of perjury,
or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one
year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court
order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2
years' imprisonment or more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.
The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of
Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a
foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the
previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any
effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was
entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph.
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these convictions entered at any timey whether "before, on, or after the date of
enactment" of the new definition, meaning that offenses that were not aggravated
felonies or deportable offenses when they were committed have become so. INA
§101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(U).
The consequences of an aggravated felony conviction such as any of these
are wide-ranging and categorical, arising directly from the fact of the conviction,
regardless of the severity of the offense. The law states plainly that any "alien
convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable
from the United States." INA §238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c).6 Furthermore, non-
citizens convicted of aggravated felonies are automatically and mandatorily
disqualified from virtually any discretionary relief from removal, including
cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents, the form of relief that
replaced the much utilized § 212(c) waiver. INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§1229b(a)(3). The fact of the conviction itself strips an immigration judge of any
6More generally, the law provides that anyone convicted ofanaggravated felony at any
time after admission is removable. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
7 In addition, individuals with these convictions are specifically barred from seeking
cancellation of removal for non-LPRs, special cancellation of removal for Central
Americans under NACARA, voluntary departure, relief under the battered spouse
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, naturalization and, in most cases,
temporary protected status. See INA §101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. §1101(f)(8); INA
§240A(b)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(l)(B); INA §240A(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§1229b(b)(l)(C); 8 C.F.R. §1240.65(a); INA § 240B(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. §1229c(a)(l); INA
§240B(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(l)(C); INA §240A(b)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§1229c(b)(l)(B); INA §240A(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(l)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1244.4.
They are even barred from humanitarian relief from persecution in the form of asylum
and, in many circumstances, the more limited withholding of removal, as well. See INA §
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power to grant relief from removal. Following deportation for an aggravated
felony conviction, an individual is permanently barred from reentering the United
States. INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(A).
Extensive coordination has also developed, as mandated by Congress,
between the criminal and immigration enforcement systems to ensure that
individuals convicted of aggravated felonies move as quickly and directly as
possible from the criminal system into removal proceedings or, in many cases,
straight to removal itself without even the formality of an administrative removal
hearing. Individuals with aggravated felony convictions and virtually any other
criminal conviction are subject to mandatory detention during the pendency of
their removal proceedings,8 and the Department of Homeland Security9 "shall"
take them into custody immediately upon their release from state custody,
including release on parole, supervised release or probation. Id. DHS is further
required by law to implement and maintain a computer-based system to identify
individuals in state and local custody who have been arrested for aggravated
felonies and to facilitate communication with federal authorities regarding the
208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(2)(B)(i); INA §208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); INA §241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(C); §241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8
U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
8INA §236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), providing for mandatory detention ofanyone
removable and/or inadmissible for convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude,
aggravated felonies, drug offenses, firearms and "miscellaneous" offenses.
9With the transfer of authority under 6 U.S.C. § 557 as of March 1, 2003, the title
"Attorney General" is synonymous with the Secretary of Homeland Security. U.S. v.
Rios-Zamora, 153 Fed.Appx. 517, 520-521, 2005 WL 2995592 (10th Cir. 2005).
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arrest, conviction and release of such individuals. INA §236(d), 8 U.S.C.
§1226(d).
The identification and removal of non-citizens with convictions has become
a high ICE enforcement priority, and ICE recently unveiled its "Secure
Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens,"
March 28, 2008, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure communities.htm.
Building on ICE's progress of the last few years in this area, the new plan
represents "a multi-year initiative to more effectively identify, detain and return
removable criminal aliens incarcerated in federal, state and local prisons and
jails." In FY 2007, ICE personnel identified 164,000 removable individuals in
federal, state and local custody, and removed 95,000 individuals with criminal
records. Id.
Current immigration law also provides for removal proceedings to be held
in correctional facilities for those with aggravated felony convictions, in an effort
to ensure that all removal proceedings are completed while the individual is still
serving his or her sentence for the criminal charge and removal can occur directly
upon the individual's release to federal custody. INA § 238(a), 8 U.S.C. §1228(a).
Most strikingly, any individual with an aggravated felony conviction who is
not a lawful permanent resident (including a conditional permanent resident
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spouse of a U.S. citizen)10 may be ordered removed by a DHS employee in a
strictly administrative process without any hearing or removal proceeding at all.
INA §238(c), 8 U.S.C. §1228(c). Individuals in this administrative process are
furthermore presumed deportable on the basis of the aggravated felony conviction
alone and, on the same basis, specifically made ineligible for any discretionary
forms of relief.11 INA §238(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. §1228(b)(5); INA §238(c), 8 U.S.C.
§1228(c).
Finally, and significantly, the INA now provides that an individual
convicted of any deportable criminal offense can be ordered removed directly by a
federal district court judge in the criminal proceeding itself, without any separate
DHS administrative or hearing process whatsoever. INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§1228(c)(l). The sentencing judge may also enter a stipulated order of removal
that was negotiated as part of a plea agreement. INA § 238(c)(5), 8 U.S.C.
§1228(c)(5). Finally, a district court or magistrate judge has statutory authority to
order deportation as a condition of probation. 18 U.S.C. §3563(b)(21). In all of
these cases, the district court enters an order of removal directly at the time of
10 Ifthe spouse ofa U.S. citizen isgranted adjustment ofstatus to permanent residence
within two years of the marriage, s/he is granted conditional permanent resident status
and is subject to summary removal procedures under this section. INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. §
1186(a).
11 INA § 238(b)(5), 8U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5) ("No alien described inthis section shall be
eligible for any relief from removal that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney
General's discretion.") and INA §238(c), 8 U.S.C. §1228(c) ("Presumption of
deportability. An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed
to be deportable from the United States.").
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sentencing for the underlying criminal offense, and the individual is transferred
without further proceedings to DHS for removal upon completion of any sentence
on the criminal charge.
B. Under the Cuthrell criteria for direct consequences, as applied in
Daley, immigration consequences are now direct consequences of a
conviction.
In Daley v. State, supra, the Court of Special Appeals applied the criteria of
Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, supra, to analyze whether immigration
consequences were direct or collateral. That determination, according to Cuthrell,
turns on whether the consequence of a conviction "represents a definite,
immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's
punishment." 475 F.2d at 1366. The Daley court found that, in 1985, under the
immigration law as then in effect, deportation was a collateral consequence of a
conviction. However, analysis of the Daley court's reasoning makes it clear that
immigration law has changed to such an extent in the intervening years that
deportation has become a direct consequence of many convictions for non-
citizens.
The court in Daley first observed that deportation arose in the context of a
separate, civil proceeding. 61 Md. App. 486 at 489. As we have seen, this is no
longer the case for many non-citizens. For some, the consequence of deportation is
imposed by the sentencing judge directly and immediately in the course of the
21
same criminal judicial process that gives rise to the conviction. INA § 238(c), 8
U.S.C. §1228(c). There is no separate civil proceeding at all. See, e.g., United
States v. Lastor-Gomez, No. CR 08-1141 (N.D. Iowa, 2008).12
For others (non-permanent residents with aggravated felony convictions)
there is no judicial or hearing process at all in any branch of government, but
rather an administrative process in which a DHS employee determines that an
individual has a conviction and, thanks to the conclusive presumption of
deportability and disqualification from any relief (both of which arise directly
from the fact of the conviction), is able to order the individual removed without
any right to a hearing of any kind. INA §§238(b) and 238(c). For many individuals
convicted of crimes, there is simply no longer a separate civil proceeding to
determine deportability.
Furthermore, it has been questioned how meaningful a separate process is
when the decision-maker there has a purely bureaucratic or clerical function of
connecting the dots to a pre-ordained outcome. The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), observed that "when an event is a
certain consequence of a decision by a court, it is meaningless to say that the court
did not ordain that event; any action by other institutions are purely ministerial."
12 This case is one of nearly 297 inwhich guilty pleas were entered and defendants were
sentenced within 10 days in May 2008. In each case, the district court, as part of the
sentencing, entered a stipulated judicial order of removal pursuant to INA § 238(c)(5), 8
U.S.C. §1228(c)(5).
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Id. 311 F.3d at 190. Thus, many non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies no
longer have access to a separate, civil proceeding in which deportation decisions
are made, and even those that do, have lost a meaningful opportunity for the
separate tribunal to make any determination other than an order of removal.
The Daley court next observed that deportation was "neither 'definite' not
'largely automatic,'" and referred specifically to discretionary relief then available
to defendants in immigration proceedings. 61 Md. App. 486 at 490. As we have
seen, anyone convicted of an aggravated felony is now removable and is
disqualified categorically, precisely because of the conviction, from virtually any
relief from removal. Thus, even for individuals who are given an immigration
hearing, deportation for anyone with an aggravated felony conviction has become
both definite and largely automatic, and an immigration judge is powerless to do
anything other than confirm the fact of the conviction and order removal.
Next, the Daley court observed that deportation proceedings in that case
were by no means "immediate," as the defendant in Daley only came to the
attention of the immigration authorities and was put into deportation proceedings
nearly two years after he pled guilty when he reentered the country after travel
abroad. Id. The court observed that proceedings "might never have been
13 Individuals with aggravated felony convictions remain eligible for the most limited
form of relief under the Convention Against Torture, an international convention which
prohibits the United States and other signatories from returning an individual to a country
where s/he will be tortured. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.
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instituted" had he not left the country. In contrast, significant systems now ensure
that non-citizen criminal defendants are identified quickly and move directly and
immediately to immigration proceedings or even straight to removal, and DHS has
prioritized the removal of non-citizens with convictions.
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm. DHS is required
by law to take custody of an individual with a removable conviction directly upon
his or her release from state or local custody, and the government has put elaborate
systems into place to identify and keep track of these individuals even while they
are still serving their criminal sentences.
This was the extent of the Court of Special Appeals' analysis in Daley, and
it is clear that the vast changes in immigration law since 1985 have changed the
outcome of this Cuthrell inquiry with regard to the directness of immigration
consequences. In the case of aggravated felony convictions such as the one at issue
before this Court, application of the Cuthrell criteria reveals that immigration
consequences have, in fact, become "definite, immediate and largely automatic."
A number of courts have addressed this question, including the Second
Circuit, which has openly questioned whether immigration consequences should
be characterized as direct, but has not had occasion to rule on the question. In
Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the "possibility of discretionary deportation after a guilty plea
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is a 'collateral' consequence," 506 F.3d at 167, but went on to recognize the
potential ramifications of legal changes with regard to the consequences of
aggravated felony convictions:
The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), however, has altered the landscape
of immigration law, and deportation of aggravated felons is now automatic
and non-discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iiO: see also INS v. St.
Cvr. 533 U.S. 289, 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (referring
to deportation of aggravated felons as "certain").
The court declined to decide the issue of directness, though, because it found that
the lower court's statements regarding deportation in the case before it were
sufficient whether the consequences were held to be direct or collateral. Id. In the
earlier case of United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), the same
Circuit even more directly questioned whether immigration could still be
considered a collateral consequence:
Given [the 1996 immigration law] amendments, an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony is automatically subject to removal and no one - not the
judge, the INS, nor even the United States Attorney General - has any
discretion to stop the deportation. Therefore, Defendant argues, the
rationale behind the decisions in Parrino and Santelises - that deportation
is not a direct consequence because it is not automatic - no longer reflects
the state of the law. Instead, deportation today is an essentially certain,
automatic, and unavoidable consequence of an alien's conviction for an
aggravated felony.
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311 F.3d at 189-90. The court went on, "On its face, Defendant's argument is
persuasive, and we believe that it deserves careful consideration," however, the
court found it unnecessary to rule on constitutional grounds. Id. at 190.
Other federal and state courts which have declined to find immigration
consequences to be direct have relied in large part on the fact that deportation is
decided in a separate forum in a separate proceeding. See, e.g., El-Nobani v.
United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[I]t is clear that deportation is
not within the control and responsibility of the district court, and hence,
deportation is collateral to a conviction."); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d
511, 516-17 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether an alien will be removed is still up to the
INS. There is a process to go through, and it is wholly independent of the court
imposing sentence.... Removal is not part of the sentence."); and United States v.
Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) ("However 'automatically' [the
defendant's] deportation ... might follow from his conviction, it remains beyond
the control and responsibility of the district court in which that conviction was
entered and it thus remains a collateral consequence thereof."); People v. DeJesus,
12 Misc.3d 913, 917-918, 819 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2006)
(immigration consequences collateral despite definite, automatic nature because
they are imposed by an "independent agency"); Rumpel v. State, 847 So.2d 399,
401 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
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However, as we have seen, it is no longer true that deportation necessarily
occurs in a separate proceeding and is "wholly independent of the court imposing
sentence." U.S. district courts now impose removal orders directly as part of
sentencing under INA § 238(c). See, e.g., United States v. Lastor-Gomez, supra.
The immigration consequence has become a part of the criminal sentencing itself.
This melding of the criminal with the immigration process has gone the last step in
erasing any meaningful distinction between the two fora, when the immigration
consequence is imposed together with, in the same forum as, and by the same
judge who enters the conviction itself.14
Furthermore, as recognized by the Second Circuit in United States v. Couto,
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), where another tribunal has no power but to impose
an automatic order of deportation because of a conviction, "any action by other
institutions are purely ministerial" and do not change the certainty or directness of
the consequence. 331 F.3d at 190. This is certainly illustrated by the case of non-
permanent residents with aggravated felony convictions who are ordered removed
14 See, Ethan Venner Torrey, 'The Dignity ofCrimes'1: Judicial Removal ofAliens and
the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 187, 199-200 (1999),
arguing against the use ofjudicial deportation on the grounds that it would so enmesh the
criminal and immigration processes as to require constitutional protections in both:
If deportation decisions are embodied in plea agreements, however, as permitted
by Section 1228(c) [INA §238(c)], then deportation would become part of "the
sentence of the court which accepted the plea," and would emphatically not be the
decision of "another agency over which the trial judge has no control and for
which he has no responsibility." Deportation would therefore be a direct
consequence of a criminal conviction,
(citing Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) and United States v.
George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989)).
27
summarily by non-adjudicatory DHS employees under INA § 238(b) upon a
simple finding that (1) the individual is the person named and (2) he or she has
been convicted of an aggravated felony.
Petitioner's case is illustrative. Had Petitioner's case arisen under the
immigration law that existed in 1985 when the Court of Special Appeals decided
Daley, he would have been much less likely to have come to the attention of
immigration authorities. Had he come to their attention, his conviction might have
been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, and had he been found
deportable because of that crime, he would have been eligible to apply for
discretionary relief from deportation in the form of the §212(c) waiver and would
have had a better-than-50% chance of being granted relief. In 1985, there would
have been a significant number of unknowns and uncertainties between a
conviction such as the Petitioner's and the consequence of deportation.
Following the myriad changes in the immigration law in and prior to 1996,
however, the consequence of removal followed without possibility of deviation
from Petitioner's conviction. He pled guilty and was charged by ICE as removable
because of an aggravated felony conviction pursuant to INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8
U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Once the fact of his conviction was established, he was
conclusively presumed to be removable under §238(c), 8 U.S.C. §1228(c). Also
because of his aggravated felony conviction, he was disqualified from even
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applying for any discretionary relief from removal.15 Having denied him non-
discretionary relief under the Convention Against Torture, the immigration judge
had no option other than to order him removed.
The long-standing rule that immigration consequences are collateral has
been fatally undermined by the changes in the structure and enforcement of
immigration law, which render deportation orders the automatic result of certain
convictions and have integrated immigration into the criminal process to the extent
that in some cases sentencing courts are now entering orders of removal directly.
Amici ask this Court to recognize this evolution and to hold that immigration
consequences have become direct consequences of a conviction, which, especially
in the case of aggravated felony convictions, flow directly and without opportunity
for discretionary relief or meaningful adjudicatory proceedings in another forum,
from the fact of the conviction alone.
C. Petitioner's plea was unconstitutionally unknowing and
involuntary, as he was not given accurate and sufficient information
about the direct immigration consequences of his plea.
The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
15 The exceptional circumstances of the Petitioner's departure from his country ledhimto
apply for the non-discretionary remedy of deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT), which was denied. Respondent was unable to carry the very
heavy burden of proving that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by or
with the acquiescence of his government upon return to his country. Most individuals, of
course, would not come from circumstances that would even justify an application for
CAT relief, and would have been disqualified from any application for relief at all.
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action open to the defendant." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162
(1970). It is well established that, in order to be constitutionally valid, a plea must
include a knowing and voluntary waiver of essential constitutional rights such as
the right to trial by jury, the right to testify, the right to confront witnesses and the
right to counsel. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23
L.Ed.2d 274, 279 (1969).
To be knowing and intelligent, a plea must be based on accurate
information about and an understanding of the nature of the charges and the direct
consequences of the plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct.
1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970). "Out of just consideration for persons
accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted
unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences." Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (quoting
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); see also Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 653 (1972) (stating that the three-pronged test includes that
the plea of guilty must be made voluntarily, it must be made after proper advice,
and it must be made with full understanding of the consequences).
It is also long established that the failure to advise or the reliance on
affirmative misadvice about direct consequences of a conviction can render a plea
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constitutionally infirm as an unknowing or involuntary waiver of constitutional
rights. Pilkington v. United States, 315 F2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963) (misleading
statements by the court or attorneys as to maximum penalty may render plea
involuntary); United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (failure to
advise about elements of crime and possible penalties rendered plea involuntary).
Likewise, Maryland law requires that a plea be knowing and voluntary and
that a defendant understand the direct consequences of the plea. Maryland Rule 4-
242 provides in relevant part:
(c) Plea of guilty. The court may not accept a plea of guilty until
after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted
by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any
combination thereof, the court determines and announces on the record that
(1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual
basis for the plea.
Md Rule 4-242(c)(emphasis added). This Court has found this rule, together with
the U.S. Constitution, to require that a defendant be given accurate and sufficient
information about the direct consequences of a plea. Yoswick v. State, supra, 347
Md. at 239 (1997) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at
1711, 23 LJEd.2d at 279 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970); and Hudson v. State, 286 Md. 569,
595, 409 A.2d 692, 705 (1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 845, 101 S.Ct. 128, 66
L.Ed.2d53(1980)).
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As discussed, supra, immigration consequences have become direct
consequences of a conviction, and a constitutionally valid plea cannot be made in
reliance on mistaken information about those immigration consequences.
In this case, there is ample evidence that the Petitioner was given mistaken
information about the immigration consequences of his plea, and that he relied to
his detriment on that erroneous information. The record contains a very clear,
unequivocal letter to Petitioner's counsel from the State's Attorney which plainly
states: "...a Contributing charge does not make a defendant eligible for
deportation proceedings." E. 89. The letter also indicates that the source of this
information was a DHS Special Agent. Petitioner's trial counsel testified that this
information was communicated to Petitioner and both he and Petitioner testified
that it was their understanding at the time of the plea that a plea to this particular
charge would not carry immigration consequences. E. 64 and E. 56 (Trial counsel:
"... I never thought that he would be subject to deportation because of the plea,
based on the assurances Ms. Herdman had made me, you know, of INS policy.").
Where, as here, a defendant can demonstrate that he affirmatively relied on
inadequate or inaccurate information about a direct consequence of his or her plea,
including the direct immigration consequences of an aggravated felony conviction,
such plea cannot be found to have been a voluntary choice between known
alternatives, as required by Boykin, or a plea entered "voluntarily, with
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understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea," as
required by Md. Rule 4-242(c).
II. Petitioner entered his plea in reliance on actual misinformation about
immigration consequences, and as such, his plea is constitutionally
invalid because it was unknowing and involuntary, regardless of
whether the consequences are considered direct or collateral.
Courts in numerous federal and state jurisdictions have addressed the question of
the constitutionality of a plea entered in reliance on affirmative misinformation
about the immigration consequences of the plea. There is wide consensus that
material misinformation about these important consequences (even assuming,
arguendo, that they may be indirect) can render a plea involuntary and thus subject
to being vacated on constitutional grounds.
Numerous state and federal courts have held that affirmative misadvice by
counsel on immigration consequences may render a plea involuntary. For
example, in an October 2008 case addressing the very question before this Court,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that affirmative misrepresentation of immigration
consequences "may provide grounds for attacking the voluntariness of the plea."
Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87 (2008). The court there ordered a
hearing on the question of the effectiveness of counsel and the voluntariness of the
plea.
In a 2005 case similar in certain respects to the case at bar, counsel advised
his client that deportation was not a serious possibility, even though it was
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"technically a possibility." United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (9th
Cir. 2005). The defendant went on to plead guilty to a charge that turned out to be
an aggravated felony. The court held that counsel effectively misled his client as to
immigration consequences and recognized an "affirmative misrepresentation"
exception to the collateral consequences rule, allowing pleas to be vacated in such
circumstances.
A wide range of federal and courts have found affirmative misinformation
on immigration consequences to justify the vacating of a plea as involuntary. See,
e.g., Sandoval v. INS., 240 F.3d 577, 578 -579 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[I]f a defendant
enters a plea of guilty in reasonable reliance upon the erroneous advice of counsel
that the defendants plea would have no collateral deportation consequence,
reliance on this misleading advice can render the defendant's plea involuntary.");
United States v. Couto, supra, 311 F.3d at 190 (2d Cir.) (affirmative
misrepresentation by counsel as to deportation consequences is ineffective
assistance of counsel, rendering plea involuntary and thus invalid); United States
v. Gajendragadkar, 149 F.3d 1171 (unpub. 4th Cir. 1998) (plea vacated where
counsel erroneously advised defendant that plea to aggravated felony would not
subject him to deportation); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768-9 (11th
Cir. 1985) (counsel's affirmative misrepresentation in response to a specific
inquiry from defendant may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); United
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States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 -1213 (E.D. Va. 1995) (clear
consensus among the courts that have decided on the issue that affirmative
misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance) (citing,
inter alia, State v. Sallato, 519 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1988); United States v. Santelises,
509 F.2d 703, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying coram nobis petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel because it did not allege affirmative misstatement
of plea's consequences)); United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (fact that a defendant has been misled as to consequence of deportability
may render his guilty plea subject to attack); United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653
F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (affirmative misrepresentations in response
to specific inquiries may support claim of constitutional defect in plea).
A large number of state courts have also recognized the potential
involuntariness of pleas entered based on affirmative misinformation about
immigration consequences. See, e.g., State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 at 804 (N.M.
2004) (holding that both affirmative misadvice and failure to advise about
immigration give rise to constitutional violation); In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230,
251, 19 P.3d 1171, 1185 (Sup. Ct. CA 2001) (clear consensus is that an
affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute constitutional
violation, see especially footnote 14 at 19 P.3d 1185); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125
P.3d 930, 934 (Utah 2005) (affirmative misstatement of deportation consequences
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can invalidate plea); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36 (Ct. App.
1987) ("formulaic warning" about immigration consequences constitutionally
insufficient); People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109,2003 WL 22764237(2003);
Berumen v. Berrong, 1990 WL 10997,*2 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 1990) (affirmative
misrepresentation regarding likelihood of deportation could render guilty plea
involuntary); People v. Correa, 124 111. App.3d 668, 80 111. Dec. 395,465 N.E.2d
507, 512 (111. App. 1984) (where defense counsel represented to his client that plea
will not result in his deportation and defendant relied on this patently erroneous
advice in deciding to plead guilty, post-conviction relief is appropriate), affd, 108
I11.2d 541, 92 111. Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985); People v. Ping Cheung, 186
Misc.2d 507, 718 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2000) (affirmative
misstatements or incorrect advice regarding deportation consequences render plea
subject to being vacated). Accord, Aldus v. State, 748 A.2d 463 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
Maine 2000); State v. Garcia, 727 A.2d 97 (NJ. App. Div. 1999); Williams v.
State, 641 N.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. Ind.1994); Dugart v. State, 578 So.2d 789 (Ct.
App. Fl. 1991); Mottv. State, 407 N.W.2d 581 (Sup.Ct. Iowa 1987).
Likewise, misinformation provided by a court regarding immigration
consequences can render a plea involuntary, even where the court would ordinarily
have no obligation to advise the defendant about them. See, e.g., Daramy v. United
States, 750 A.2d 552 (D.C.2000)(defendant was misled by court's misstatement of
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immigration law and entitled to withdraw plea); People v. Nguyen, 80 P.3d 903,
905 -906 (Colo.App.,2003)(defendant who reasonably relied on misinformation by
court about immigration entitled to hearing on voluntariness of plea). See also, El-
Nobani v. United States, supra, 287 F3d 417, 422 (court did not find
involuntariness where no advice was given but left open the question of the effect
of misrepresentation as to consequences: "Because the government did not
misrepresent to petitioner the consequences of his plea, petitioner cannot show that
his plea was involuntary and unknowing.").
Furthermore, the trial court's obligation to protect a defendant's
constitutional rights is not necessarily fulfilled simply by complying with a rule
such as Md Rule 4-242(e), which requires that a court inform a defendant that he
or she "may face additional consequences of deportation, detention, or ineligibility
for citizenship." The court must ensure that the dictates of the Constitution itself
have been met. For this reason, the simple fact that the trial court complied with
Md Rule 4-242(e), does not end the inquiry into whether a plea was
constitutionally knowing and voluntary.
The record in the case before this Court is clear that the Petitioner was very
concerned about the immigration consequences of his plea, and that he sought
repeated assurances that his plea would not affect his immigration status. See, e.g.,
E. 25, E. 60. Petitioner finally agreed to plead only after receiving the
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unequivocal, written assurance of the prosecutor, based on advice from an ICE
attorney, that the proposed plea "does not make a defendant eligible for
deportation proceedings." E. 89. Testimony of trial counsel and the Petitioner also
indicates clearly that the immigration issue was a "deal breaker," E. 41, and that
but for that assurance, counsel would not have advised him to and Petitioner
would not have accepted the plea offer. E. 40, E. 61. The record shows further that
the trial court made reference to the immigration issues involved in the case,
without offering any opinion on the consequences, but lending the court's
authority nonetheless to the mistaken understanding of the parties regarding
deportation consequences. E. 17, E. 61 (Petitioner: "And even the judge make a
comment saying make sure that he won't have immigration consequences, I
recall.").16
There is ample evidence in the record that Petitioner relied to his detriment
on the erroneous information and advice he was given regarding the immigration
consequences of his plea. Even if these important consequences are collateral, that
reliance rendered his plea involuntary and it should be vacated.
16 Though trial counsel testified under cross examination at the coram nobis hearing that
he would, essentially, never say never regarding the possibility of deportation, his
testimony was unequivocal as to his understanding, based on the assurances from ICE,
that this charge would not lead to deportation and that he had communicated that
understanding to his client. E. 55, E. 56, E. 57. The State's Attorney's understanding of
the issue is memorialized in the unequivocal language of her letter to counsel stating that
the charge "does not" make a defendant eligible for deportation. E. 89.
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III. Granting coram nobis relief in this case would be consistent with
decisions in other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, which have held
pleas to be involuntary when entered in reliance on erroneous
information about important non-immigration consequences, both
direct and collateral.
A wide range of courts has held that pleas entered on the basis of misinformation
regarding important (non-immigration) consequences are involuntary. This has
been true in cases involving direct consequences as well as consequences held to
be collateral. Examples of cases involving direct, non-immigration consequences
include: United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (where the
court failed to inform defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence resulting
from his guilty plea, the proper remedy was to vacate defendant's guilty pleas and
convictions); Jamison v. Klem, 2008 WL 4405147, 10 (3d Cir. 2008) (where
defendant was not made aware of the mandatory minimum five-year sentence to
which he would be sentenced as a result of his plea, but only the maximum 20
year sentence, the court found that defendant's plea was not voluntary); Ex parte
Bell, 2006 WL 1171812, 1 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Tex.Crim.App.,2006) (erroneous
advice about whether sentence would run concurrently rendered plea involuntary).
More importantly for this case, courts have also been willing to vacate
pleas in cases in which defendants were affirmatively misinformed about
important, but collateral, non-immigration consequences. In Strader v. Garrison,
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611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth Circuit held in a case that involved parole
eligibility,
though parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a
guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not
inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies
upon that misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel.
Id, 611 F.2d at 64-65. See also, Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir.
1995) (overruled on other grounds by O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir.
1996)) (client who relied on misinformation given after he asked for advice about
eligibility for work release met first prong on constitutional test for ineffective
assistance of counsel); In State v. Stowe, 71 Wash.App. 182, 858 P.2d 267 (1993),
the court found that the defendant had specifically inquired about the collateral
consequence of continued military eligibility and that counsel had given erroneous
information about it. Finding further that the defendant had clearly relied on the
erroneous advice, the court found that the plea was involuntary and permitted the
defendant to withdraw it. Id, 858 P.2d at 270. See also, Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d
1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirmative misadvice regarding parole eligibility may
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel rendering the plea invalid); Sparks v.
Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that "gross misadvice
concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel" and
render a guilty plea invalid); People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 941-43 (Colo. 1991)
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(generally acknowledging that incorrect advice regarding a collateral consequence
could render guilty plea invalid if both prongs of Strickland are met); Roberti v.
State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that "[affirmative
misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the plea");
Hornakv. Warden, State Prison, 488 A.2d 850, 853, 40 Conn.Supp. 238, 242-243,
(Conn. Super.1985) ("When, however, a defendant is grossly misadvised, even as
to a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and he relies upon the misinformation,
he is deprived of the right to counsel and his plea is deemed involuntary and
unintelligent.").
It is also noteworthy that this Court in Yoswick acknowledged that the
analysis of constitutional error with regard to collateral consequences might be
different in the case of a court that provided affirmative misinformation about
those consequences, even where there was no initial obligation to provide any
information. Yoswick, supra, 347 Md. 228, 258-59 ("This is not a case in which
the trial court has provided a defendant with misinformation regarding parole, and
we leave that issue for another day.").
In the case before this Court, Petitioner was given affirmative
misinformation about an undoubtedly important consequence of his plea,
misinformation which was passed on to him by his counsel and the prosecutor and
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indirectly confirmed by the court. He relied on that misinformation in deciding to
accept the plea, and he was prejudiced. As such, his plea was not a knowing and
voluntary choice between known alternatives, and it should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's plea was unconstitutionally involuntary and unknowing
because it was based on erroneous advice about immigration consequences. The
vast changes in our nation's laws regarding immigration and crimes have rendered
deportation a direct consequence of convictions, and a plea entered based on
misinformation about these direct consequences cannot be knowing and voluntary.
Furthermore, even if such consequences are considered collateral, a plea entered in
reliance on affirmative misinformation or advice about such important
consequences is unconstitutionally involuntary.
Wherefore, Amici ask this Court to reverse the decision of the lower court
and grant Petitioner's petition for a writ of coram nobis.
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